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According to Descartes, the Meditations and Objections and Replies 
contain a logically sound proof that he has a Cartesian mind, along with a 
comprehensive explanation of that proof. A close look at these texts, 
however, reveals that things are not quite as sound and comprehensive as 
Descartes says they are. For the proof -- which is formally presented in the 
Sixth Meditation -- contains a dubious premise. When some of his objectors 
point this out, Descartes replies that the truth of the premise was firmly 
established in the Second Meditation. But this comes as a rather startling 
reply, since in the Second Meditation itself, and numerous other places, 
Descartes ( quite correctly) denies that such a premise is ever established 
there. So, in spite of Descartes's attempt to locate a justification for it, the 
said premise remains unjustified and dubious. 
In the pages that follow I try to present this criticism in more detail. In 
doing so I examine several parts of the Meditations. Descartes makes it fairly 
clear that the Sixth Meditation proof is not isolated from the rest of the 
Meditations, but rather is to a great extent motivated and driven by the 
material that precedes it. So, as well as examining the Sixth Meditation 
proof, I also examine the 'method of doubt' in the First Meditation, the 
cogito ergo sum and sum res cogitans passages in the Second Meditation, 
and the passages concerned with clear and distinct ideas and God in the 
Third, Fourth and Fifth Meditations. Once the import of these passages 
becomes clear, it becomes relatively easy to see the weakness in Descartes's 
proof that he has a Cartesian mind. 
Ill 
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CARTESIAN MINDS, CARTESIAN BODIES, 
AND SUBSTANCE DUALISM. 
1 
A smoked-filled bar. Kevin, a Masters student, and Bevan, a first-year 
student, are seated in a corner booth, guzzling beer and talking philosophy. 
Copies of Descartes's Meditations and Objections and Replies lurk in 
Kevin's coat pocket. 
1.1 The scope of this enquiry. 
BEV AN: What's your thesis about? 
KEVIN: I'm studying the argument Descartes gives in his Meditations 
on First Philosophy for the existence of his Cartesian mind. I'm afraid I 
don't find it very convincing. 
BEVAN: I understand that Descartes discusses this issue in several of 
his works, not just the Meditations. Are you studying these other works 
too? 
KEVIN: No. The way I see it, Descartes tries especially hard to do two 
things in the Meditations: (1) prove that he has a Cartesian mind (or, as he 
puts it, that his mind is distinct from his body); and (2) prove that God 
exists. That these two are his main goals is revealed very early on in the 
piece -- the subtitle of the Meditations reads, "in which are demonstrated 
the existence of God and the distinction between the human soul and the 
body". 1 So my feeling is that the Meditations is the place where Descartes 
gives the existence of his Cartesian mind (and God) his most careful 
attention. I mean, just listen to this extract from his Dedicatory Letter, which 
accompanied the copy of the Meditations that was presented to the Faculty 
of Theology in Paris: 
1 Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch, Vol. II (1984) -- hereafter, CSM II -- p. 12. Descartes also 
emphasizes that (1) and (2) are his main goals throughout the Dedicatory Letter (CSM II, pp. 3-6) and the 
Preface (CSM II, pp. 6-8). 
What I have done [in the Meditations] is to take merely the 
principal and most important arguments and develop them in 
such a way that I would now venture to put them forward as very 
certain and evident demonstrations. I will add that these proofs 
are of such a kind that I reckon they leave no room for the 
possibility that the human mind will ever discover better ones. 
(CSM II, p. 4) 
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BEV AN: It sounds like Descartes is pretty confident he has sorted these 
matters out once and for all. 
KEVIN: It does, doesn't it. In fact, prior to its publication Descartes 
went so far as to send copies of the Meditations out to various philosophers 
and theologians, asking these gentlemen to write back with any criticisms 
they had of it. Then, when he heard back from them, Descartes wrote replies 
to all the criticisms, and sent the whole lot off to be published alongside the 
Meditations, under the title Objections and Replies. 
BEVAN: I presume he didn't think any of the criticisms were 
damaging. 
KEVIN: No, not at all. Descartes doesn't concede an inch to his critics. 
In spite of this, however, the Objections and Replies is a useful companion 
to the Meditations, as it contains many explanations and clarifications of the 
issues that are presented there. So I haven't quite limited myself to the 
Meditations alone -- I've studied the Objections and Replies too. Actually, 
Descartes himself advises that the two should be studied together, in his 
Preface to the Meditations: 
... I certainly do not promise to satisfy my [serious] readers 
straightaway on all points, and I am not so presumptuous as to 
believe that I am capable of foreseeing all the difficulties which 
anyone may find. So first of all, in the Meditations, I will set out 
the very thoughts which have enabled me, in my view, to arrive 
at a certain and evident knowledge of the truth, so that I can find 
out whether the same arguments which have convinced me will 
enable me to convince others. Next, I will reply to the objections 
of various men of outstanding intellect and scholarship who had 
these Meditations sent to them for scrutiny before they went to 
press. For the objections they raised were so many and so varied 
that I would venture to hope that it would be hard for anyone 
else to think of any point -- at least of any importance -- which 
these critics have not touched on. I therefore ask my readers not 
to pass judgement on the Meditations until they have been kind 
enough to read through all these objections and my replies to 
them. (CSM II, p. 8) 
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BEVAN: So you've been studying the Meditations and Objections and 
Replies, but none of Descartes's other works. Is that right? 
KEVIN: Yes. According to Descartes, a comprehensive and convincing 
account of the existence of his Cartesian mind can be found in the 
Meditations and Objections and Replies alone. So I've been taking him at 
his word, and looking at just these two sets of writings.2 
1.2 A Cartesian mind thinks. 
BEVAN: What exactly is a Cartesian mind? 
KEVIN: Throughout the Meditations and Objections and Replies, 
Descartes emphasizes three features of a Cartesian mind: (1) it thinks; (2) it is 
not extended; and (3) it is a substance. I'll run through these features 
separately for you, and flesh them out a little. Hopefully this will answer 
your question. 
Before I start though, let me point out that Descartes never uses the 
phrase 'Cartesian mind' himself. Mostly he uses just 'mind'. That's a little 
2 My tone in this section suggests that Descartes only gives one proof of the existence of his Cartesian 
mind in the Meditations. In actual fact, I think he gives two. However, I am only going to discuss the 
proof that occurs early on in the Sixth Meditation (CSM II, p. 54), not the one that occurs late in the 
Sixth Meditation (CSM II, p. 59). It is the former proof that the preceding Meditations are most 
obviously related to, and that receives all the attention in the Objections and Replies. Consequently, I 
consider this to be the more important of the two. 
The proof that occurs late in the Sixth Meditation is the following: 
... there is a great difference between the mind and the body, inasmuch as the body is by 
its very nature always divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible. For when I consider 
the mind, or myself in so far as I am merely a thinking thing, I am unable to distinguish 
any parts within myself; I understand myself to be something quite single and complete. 
Although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, I recognize that if a foot 
or arm or any other part of the body is cut off, nothing has thereby been taken away from 
the mind. As for the faculties of willing, of understanding, of sensory perception and so on, 
these cannot be termed parts of the mind, since it is one and the same mind that wills, and 
understands and has sensory perceptions. By contrast, there is no corporeal or extended 
thing that I can think of which in my thought I cannot easily divide into parts; and this 
very fact makes me understand that it is divisible. This one argument would be enough to 
show me that the mind is completely different from the body, even if I did not already 
know as much from other considerations. (CSM II, p. 59. "Other considerations" is a 
reference to the proof I am going to examine.) 
Apart from a para-phrasing in the Synopsis, there is no further discussion of this proof. I too will refrain 
from discussing it, suffice to say that my criticism of Descartes's other proof can be leveled at this one 
also. 
4 
confusing though, since 'mind' means different things to different people. 
Some people think that to talk about minds is really to talk about brains, for 
example, and others think that to talk about minds is really to talk about 
behaviour. When Descartes talks about minds though, he's talking about 
something different again. So I'm going to use the phrase 'Cartesian mind' 
instead of 'mind', just so you don't forget that we're discussing Descartes's 
view of the 'mind' here, not yours or mine or anyone else's . 
And one more thing. Descartes sometimes uses words other than 
'mind' to refer to his Cartesian mind. Sometimes he uses 'soul', and 
sometimes 'I'. He makes it clear that these words are synonymous though, 
when he says things like, 
and, 
... while the body can very easily perish, the mind < or the soul 
of man, for I make no distinction between them > is immortal by 
its very nature (Synopsis of the six following Meditations, CSM II, 
p. 10), 
... it is certain that I < that is, my soul, by which I am what I am > 
am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it. (Sixth 
Meditation, CSM II, p. 54)3 
So don't worry if I quote you passages where Descartes is talking about his 
soul, or himself, and I say they are passages about his Cartesian mind. It's 
not that I'm trying to pull a fast one on you, but rather that Descartes is just 
using some synonyms. 
Now then, the first feature that Descartes emphasizes about a Cartesian 
mind is that it thinks, as the following passages demonstrate: 
... I conceive of myself as a thing that thinks and is not extended 
... (Third Meditation, CSM II, p. 30, my emphasis) 
3 Phrases within diamond brackets are found in the French version of the Meditations (published in 
1647), but not the Latin version (published in 1642). Although Cottingham's translation (Cottingham 
translated the Meditations and Objections and Replies alone) is based on the Latin version, he frequently 
inserts phrases from the French version, phrases which he feels "offer useful glosses on, or additions to, 
the original" Latin version (CSM II, p. 2). Whenever such a phrase occurs in a passage I quote, I will --
as Cottingham does -- place it in diamond brackets. 
... the idea I have of the human mind, in so far as it is a thinking 
thing, which is not extended in length, breadth or height and has 
no other bodily characteristics, is much more distinct than the 
idea of any corporeal thing. (Fourth Meditation, CSM II, p. 37, my 
emphasis) 
. . . I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am 
simply a thinking, non-extended thing ... (Sixth Meditation, 
CSM II, p. 54, my emphasis) 
... understanding, willing, doubting etc. are forms by which I 
recognize the substance which is called mind. (4th Set of Replies, 
CSM II, p. 157, Descartes's emphasis) 
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BEVAN: This last passage mentions 'understanding', 'willing' and 
'doubting' rather than 'thinking'. Is it Descartes's view that thinking is 
composed of activities like those? 
KEVIN: Yes, thinking is made up of those activities plus a few more. 
Descartes gives a slightly longer list in the Second Meditation, when he 
explains that a thing that thinks is a thing that 
... doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, 
and also imagines and has sensory perceptions. (Second 
Meditation, CSM II, p. 19) 
And this explanation is repeated almost word for word at the beginning of 
the Third Meditation.4 
BEVAN: It seems to me that, in saying a Cartesian mind thinks, 
Descartes has told us of the tasks a Cartesian mind performs -- it performs 
the tasks of doubting, of understanding, of affirming, of denying etc. etc. 
KEVIN: That's a nice way of putting it. And Descartes has decided to 
use 'thinking' as a catch-all phrase for these psychological tasks. So, what 
does a Cartesian mind do? Answer: a Cartesian mind thinks. 
BEVAN: But how helpful is it to describe a thing in terms of the tasks 
it performs? Does that tell you much about the thing itself? I mean, the 'Is it 
an animal, mineral, or vegetable?' type of question still remains 
unanswered, doesn't it. For example, if I say I've got a 'guard', and describe 
it as 'a thing that protects me', I don't really indicate what my guard looks 
4 CSM II, p. 24. 
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like, or what it's made of etc. I've indicated what it does, but no one as yet 
can say it is or it isn't a legal guardian, a big brother, a bodyguard, a guard 
dog, a gun, a guardian angel, God, or any number of other things. The 
description I've given of my guard isn't specific enough to indicate one 
particular thing. It only indicates a set of things -- those things that can 
protect me. 
KEVIN: You're quite right. Saying of a Cartesian mind that it thinks 
leaves it very much up in the air what a Cartesian mind is exactly. It could 
turn out to be any one of a number of things. Perhaps it's a ghostly spirit. 
Perhaps it's a sophisticated artificial device, like a computer. Maybe it's a 
human body. Maybe it's an alien that's sending out signals to a human body 
Gust as a T.V. transmitter sends out signals to a T.V.). 
You're actually not alone in seeing how 'un-revealing' it is to describe 
something as 'a thing that thinks'. Gassendi, the author of the Fifth Set of 
Objections, has this to say in response to Descartes's claims that he is 'a 
thing that thinks': 
In saying that you are simply 'a thing that thinks' you mention 
an operation of which all of us were already well aware; but you 
tell us nothing of the substance which performs this operation --
what kind of substance it is, and what it consists of, how it 
organizes itself to perform so many different functions in so 
many different ways, and other matters of this kind ... (CSM II, 
pp. 185-186)5 
Personally, I think you and Gassendi have a valid point. Being told that a 
Cartesian mind thinks is of course better than being told nothing, but it 
doesn't really get us to the point where we can say, 'Oh, now I know what a 
Cartesian mind is.' We need more information for that.6 
1.3 A Cartesian mind is not extended, 
KEVIN (cont.): Fortunately, Descartes does provide more information. 
Another thing he says is that a Cartesian mind is not extended. Consider the 
5 See also Gassendi's comments on pp. 192-193 of CSM II, which are similar in nature. 
6 The reason why I have spent time in this section discussing how 'un-revealing' it is to say of a thing 
that it thinks is to introduce an idea that will be taken up in more detail from Chapter 5 onwards --
namely, Descartes's claim that he thinks does not by itself entail that he is unextended too. 
following passages: 
. . . I conceive of myself as a thing that thinks and is not extended 
... (Third Meditation, CSM II, p. 30, my emphasis) 
... the idea I have of the human mind, in so far as it is a thinking 
thing, which is not extended in length, breadth or height and has 
no other bodily characteristics, is much more distinct than the 
idea of any corporeal thing. (Fourth Meditation, CSM II, p. 37, my 
emphasis) 
... I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am 
simply a thinking, non-extended thing ... (Sixth Meditation, 
CSM II, p. 54, my emphasis) 
Even though the mind is united to the whole body, it does not 
follow that it is extended throughout the body, since it is not in its 
nature to be extended, but only to think. (Fifth Set of Replies, 
CSM II, p. 266, my emphasis) 
BEVAN: What does it mean to be 'not extended'? 
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KEVIN: Well, I guess a good way of finding out what being not 
extended amounts to is to first find out what being extended amounts to. 
And on this point Descartes is fairly clear: to be extended is to be a 
"corporeal" thing,7 a "material" thing,8 a "body".9 Something that is 
extended has a "determinable shape",10 a "definable location",11 and a 
"size".12 It occupies space "in such a way as to exclude any other body".13 
And it is a "sensory" thing14 -- it is "perceived by touch, sight, hearing, taste 
7 CSM II, p. 50ff. 
8 CSM II, pp. 11 and 50. 
9 CSM II, pp. 17 and 56. 
10 CSM II, p. 17 (also pp. 14 and 30, where different phrasing is used to express the same idea). 
11 CSM II, p. 17 (also pp. 14 and 30, where different phrasing is used to express the same idea). 
12 CSM II, pp. 14 and 30. 
13 CSM II, p. 17. 
14 CSM II, p. 53. 
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or smell".15 
BEVAN: So an extended thing is basically what I would call a 'physical 
object'. Stones and sheep and buildings and the like are extended things, but 
ghosts and angels and God and the like aren't. 
KEVIN: Yes, that's right. 
Now presumably, a Cartesian mind -- since it is not extended -- lacks all 
the features I've just listed. A Cartesian mind, then, is not a corporeal thing, 
a material thing, a body. It does not have a determinable shape, a definable 
location, or a size. It does not occupy space in such a way as to exclude any 
other body. And it is not perceived by the senses of touch, sight, hearing, 
taste or smell. 
BEV AN: So Cartesian minds belong in that group made up of ghosts 
and angels and God and the like? 
KEVIN: Yes. In fact, a phrase that has become fashionable for describing 
a Cartesian mind is 'the Ghost in the Machine'.16 
1.4 A Cartesian mind is a substance. 
KEVIN (cont.): The third feature that Descartes emphasizes about a 
Cartesian mind is that it is a substance: 
... all the things that we clearly and distinctly conceive of as 
different substances (as we do in the case of mind and body) are in 
fact substances which are really distinct one from the other . 
(Synopsis, CSM II, p. 9, my emphasis) 
. . . I think that a stone is a substance, or is a thing capable of 
existing independently, and I also think that I am a substance. 
Admittedly I conceive of myself as a thing that thinks and is not 
extended, whereas I conceive of the stone as a thing that is 
extended and does not think, so that the two conceptions differ 
enormously; but they seem to agree with respect to the 
classification 'substance'. (Third Meditation, CSM II, p. 30, my 
emphasis) 
... understanding, willing, doubting etc. are forms by which I 
recognize the substance which is called mind. (Fourth Set of 
15 CSM II, p. 17. 
16 See Ryle (1949, pp. 15-16) for tbe coining of tbe phrase. 
9 
Replies, CSM II, p. 157, my emphasis) 
This second quote here has the beginnings of an explanation as to what 
Descartes means by the term 'substance' -- a 'substance' is "a thing capable of 
existing independently". A slightly better explanation is given in the Fourth 
Set of Replies: 
... the notion of a substance is just this -- that it can exist by itself, 
that is without the aid of any other substance. (CSM II, p. 159, 
Descartes's emphasis) 
BEVAN: So any particular substance, such as a Cartesian mind, is a 
complete, self-sufficient unit? It could exist even if nothing else did? 
KEVIN: Well, not quite if nothing else did. For Descartes has this idea 
that all substances depend on God for their existence.17 But don't worry too 
much about this point. Just note that substances don't depend on anything 
besides God for their existence. Each substance that exists could do so even if 
no others did. 
BEV AN: That would be a funny sort of world, wouldn't it -- one 
Cartesian mind, and nothing else? 
KEVIN: Well yes, it does sound a bit bizarre. But I guess that once you 
accept there are substances, and that God creates them, it's not hard to 
imagine God creating just the one Cartesian mind. In fact, in the First and 
Second Meditations Descartes spends a lot of time discussing exactly that 
scenario.18 
1.5 Substance dualism and Cartesian bodies. 
KEVIN (cont.): Okay. There's a fairly brief outline of what a Cartesian 
mind is -- it's a non-extended thinking substance. Now, before I go on to tell 
you about Descartes's proof that he has one of these things, I think I should 
first paint you the wider picture, so to speak. If you are aware of Descartes's 
overall plan, I think you will better appreciate what he is trying to 
accomplish. 
In arguing that he has a Cartesian mind, Descartes is advocating a 
17 See CSM II, p. 10. 
18 See Sections 2.6 (pp. 28-32), 3.5 (pp. 42-44) and 4.1 (pp. 45-47). 
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theory called 'substance dualism'. This is a theory about what kind of 
creatures you and I and our kind are. It maintains that we are each 
composed of two quite distinct parts, one of which is -- surprise, surprise -- a 
Cartesian mind. 
BEV AN: What's the other part? 
KEVIN: Descartes calls it a 'body'. (I'll call it a 'Cartesian body', because 
again Descartes has his own unique view as to what a 'body' is.)19 Basically, 
it's the antithesis of a Cartesian mind. It too is a substance, but instead of 
being a non-extended thinking substance, it's a non-thinking extended one. 
It's composed of a whole lot of flesh and bone bits and pieces -- arms, legs, 
torso, head, brain, and other internal organs. Descartes describes it thus: 
... I propose to concentrate on what came into my thoughts 
spontaneously and quite naturally whenever I used to consider 
what I was. Well, the first thought to come to mind was that I had 
a face, hands, arms and the whole mechanical structure of limbs 
which can be seen in a corpse, and which I called the body. 
(Second Meditation, CSM II, p. 17, my emphasis) 
... I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an 
extended, non-thinking thing. (Sixth Meditation, CSM II, p. 54) 
... being extended and divisible and having shape etc. are forms 
or attributes by which I recognize the substance called body ... 
(CSM II, p. 157, Descartes's emphasis) 
BEVAN: In the first quote here Descartes likens a Cartesian body to 
what can be seen in a corpse. Does that mean he considers a Cartesian body 
to be a lifeless thing, like (say) a stone? 
KEVIN: No, I don't think so. For in the Sixth Meditation he gives a 
description of a Cartesian body that is not 'connected up' to a Cartesian 
mind (which Cartesian bodies usually are), and this creature is very much 
alive: 
... I might consider the body of a man as a kind of machine 
equipped with and made up of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, 
blood and skin in such a way that, even if there were no mind in 
19 Descartes actually has two different meanings for the word 'body'. Sometimes he means 'corporeal 
thing' (seep. 7 above). Other times his meaning concerns a particular corporeal thing. It is this second 
use of the word 'body' that I am discussing here. 
it, it would still perform all the same movements as it now does 
in those cases where movement is not under the control of the 
will or, consequently, of the mind< but occurs merely as a result 
of the disposition of the organs>. (CSM II, p. 58) 
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Descartes gives some examples of movements that occur "merely as a result 
of the disposition of the organs" in the Fourth Set of Replies: 
... a very large number of the motions occurring inside us do not 
depend in any way on the mind. These include heartbeat, 
digestion, nutrition, respiration when we are asleep, and also 
such waking actions as walking, singing and the like, when these 
occur without the mind attending to them. When people take a 
fall, and stick out their hands so as to protect their head, it is not 
reason that instructs them to do this; it is simply that the sight of 
the impending fall reaches the brain and sends the animal spirits 
into the nerves in the manner necessary to produce this 
movement even without any mental volition, just as it would be 
produced in a machine. (CSM II, p. 161) 
So a Cartesian body on its own is certainly not lifeless. But neither is it 
particularly versatile. I guess its behaviour would be fairly similar to that of 
a severely mentally-disabled adult. 
BEVAN: In having arms and legs, a torso, a head, a brain and other 
internal organs, a Cartesian body is quite clearly an extended thing. That 
much I understand. But why is it also a non-thinking thing? If it has a brain 
and other internal organs, why can't it doubt, understand, affirm, deny etc.? 
KEVIN: Well, the fundamental idea behind substance dualism is that 
no flesh and bone organs are relevant to being able to think. What's 
required for that is a further organ -- a Cartesian mind.20 So a Cartesian body 
on its own is really just a funny sort of machine, as Descartes suggests in 
those last two quotes. In fact, in the Sixth Meditation quote Descartes is 
actually likening a Cartesian body to a clock. With a clock, says Descartes, 
you have particular parts combined in a particular way, and the resulting 
movements of those parts are limited in range and (of course) machine-like. 
Similarly, reasons Descartes, with a Cartesian body on its own you have 
20 I personally find the description of a Cartesian mind as an 'organ' extremely helpful. It seems to 
disperse (if only for a moment) some of the murkiness surrounding the notion of a 'non-extended thinking 
substance', and bring everything down to a more manageable level. I stole the description from Ryle 
(1949, p. 168). 
12 
particular parts combined in a particular way, and the resulting movements 
of those parts are limited in range and machine-like. Those movements, he 
suggests, are the unthinking/instinctive/reflex movements that he and you 
and I exhibit -- breathing, going to sleep, recoiling from heat, crying out 
when the stomach is empty or the skin is pierced, perspiring when hot, 
emitting water from the eyes when around onions, reaching out when 
falling, stuff like that. Non-reflexive movements, such as buying clothes, 
preparing food, driving cars, doing crosswords, conversing with people etc., 
just don't fall within the range of movements that a Cartesian body on its 
own could perform.21 
BEV AN: So what's going on 'upstairs', or 'in the head of', a Cartesian 
body on its own? 
KEVIN: Nothing at all. Again, think in terms of machines. Try plants 
and animals too. Just ask yourself how much is going on 'upstairs' when 
(say) a Venus Fly Trap closes its leaves around a fly, or when a dog twitches 
its leg when you scratch the right spot, or when a clock keeps time, or when 
a mechanical arm does some soldering on a car assembly line. 
BEV AN: I don't suppose there's anything going on 'upstairs' in these 
cases. 
KEVIN: That's right. And that's how it would be with a Cartesian body 
too. There would be nothing going on 'upstairs', ever. A Cartesian body on 
its own would be a complete 'airhead'. 
BEV AN: This lack of thought -- it wouldn't be due (say) to a lack of 
training, or to a deformity, or to anything like that, would it? 
KEVIN: No. A Cartesian body -- even a mature healthy one -- just 
wouldn't be capable of having thoughts. It wouldn't have the right design 
for it, just as (say) a clock doesn't have the right design for having thoughts. 
BEV AN: Hmm. So having a brain and other internal organs isn't 
going to help a Cartesian body to think one bit. For according to substance 
21 That a Cartesian body on its own would be limited in its behaviour patterns is a point that has nearly 
always been missed, I think. And this has resulted in substance dualism receiving some rather bad press. 
For the mistaken view that a Cartesian body on its own would behave just like a Cartesian body-plus-
mind generates various difficulties, the most notable of which is the 'problem of other minds'. This 
problem highlights how difficult it would be to detect other Cartesian minds, if Cartesian bodies on their 
own not only looked but also acted just like Cartesian bodies-plus-minds. 
Once it is made clear, though, that Cartesian bodies on their own would be limited in their 
behaviour patterns, it becomes very easy to detect other Cartesian minds. Just look for Cartesian bodies 
that are versatile in their behaviour patterns; ones that act like that are obviously connected up to 
Cartesian minds. 
13 
dualism, thinking is an activity performed solely by Cartesian minds. Brains 
and the like don't feature in it at all. You could find a brain as big as a house, 
but you wouldn't get an ounce of thought out of it. No Cartesian mind 
means no thinking. 
KEVIN: Correct. 
Incidentally, this is exactly why Descartes often uses the expression 'My 
mind is distinct from my body' (or something similar) when claiming he 
has a Cartesian mind.22 The point he's making is that the organ responsible 
for his thinking is not one of his extended organs. It's not his brain, nor any 
other part of his body. It's an organ which lacks extension -- a Cartesian 
mind. 
1.6 The 'separateness' and 'togetherness' of a united Cartesian mind and 
body. 
KEVIN (cont.): Right, let's continue with substance dualism. According 
to the theory, you and I are made up of two distinct parts: a Cartesian mind 
-- a non-extended thinking substance; and a Cartesian body -- a non-
thinking extended substance. Now, since these two parts are substances, 
each could exist even if the other didn't. So that the two just happen to exist 
side by side in you and I doesn't detract at all from their 'separateness'. This 
point is made quite clearly by Descartes a number of times: 
... I < that is, my soul, by which I am what I am > am really 
distinct from my body, and can exist without it. (Sixth Meditation, 
CSM II, p. 54, my emphasis) 
... the mind and the body are incomplete substances when they 
are referred to a human being which together they make up. But 
if they are considered on their own, they are complete. 
For just as being extended and divisible and having shape 
etc. are forms or attributes by which I recognize the substance 
called body, so understanding, willing, doubting etc. are forms by 
which I recognize the substance which is called mind. And I 
understand a thinking substance to be just as much a complete 
thing as an extended substance. (Fourth Set of Replies, CSM II, p. 
157, Descartes's emphasis) 
22 I mentioned earlier (p. 1 above) that Descartes often expresses the matter this way. As you will see in 
Section 7 .1 (pp. 87-90), it is more or less this expression that Descartes employs in his Cartesian mind 
proof. 
. . . the notions of a thinking thing and an extended or mobile 
thing are completely different, and independent of each other .... 
[H]owever often we find them in one and the same subject -- e.g. 
when we find thought and corporeal motion in the same man --
we should not think that they are therefore one and the same in 
virtue of a unity of nature, but should regard them as the same 
only in respect of unity of composition. (Sixth Set of Replies, CSM 
II, p. 287) 
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BEVAN: I see from these last two quotes that there is something of a 
'flip-side' to the 'separateness' of a Cartesian mind and body: in spite of 
their being so different, and so complete in themselves, they still manage to 
come together somehow to form a union, which Descartes calls a 'man'. 
KEVIN: Oh yes, Descartes emphasizes this 'togetherness' just as much 
as he does their 'separateness'. The Sixth Meditation is full of claims to that 
effect. When discussing his sensory perceptions of the objects around him, 
for example, Descartes says things like, 
and, 
... the fact that some of the perceptions are agreeable to me while 
others are disagreeable makes it quite certain that my body, or 
rather my whole self, in so far as I am a combination of body and 
mind, can be affected by the various beneficial or harmful bodies 
which surround it (CSM II, p. 56, my emphasis), 
My sole concern here is with what God has bestowed on me as a 
combination of mind and body. (CSM II, p. 57) 
These indicate that Descartes considers himself to be a walking, talking, 
breathing example of a united Cartesian mind and Cartesian body. 
BEVAN: Does Descartes say much about the nature of this union? 
KEVIN: Well, one thing he says is that it's a very close, very intimate, 
union. He tries to indicate the degree of intimacy by saying it's not like the 
union of a sailor to his ship: 
Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst 
and so on, that I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is 
present in a ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, 
intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit. If this 
were not so, I, who am nothing but a thinking thing, would not 
feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the damage 
purely by the intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight if 
15 
anything in his ship is broken. (Sixth Meditation, CSM II, p. 56) 
The overall impression I get from the phrases he uses here -- "closely 
joined", "intermingled", "form a unit" -- and elsewhere -- "a kind of 
unit",23 "combination",24 "composite",25 "united"26 -- is that this union 
isn't any sort of loose affiliation. When a Cartesian body and a Cartesian 
mind are united, they are as thick as thieves, so to speak. 
Unfortunately though, Descartes doesn't say how they unite. He just 
says they do. But how a ghostly thing could ever connect up with a physical 
thing is really something of a mystery. And he doesn't say much about 
where they unite either. He suggests the brain, or perhaps a small part of 
it,27 but again this is all a bit of a mystery. Indeed, the issues of how and 
where a Cartesian mind and body unite are considered to be major problems 
with substance dualism. But don't worry yourself over these issues. 
Descartes first has to prove that a Cartesian mind exists before he can claim 
it unites with anything. And I think he's got his work cut out just doing this 
first job. 
BEVAN: Well, now that I've got the wider picture, I'm very keen to 
see if Descartes can do this first job. For I guess that if I want to believe in 
any sort of 'life after death', I have to believe there's a part of me that is 
something like a Cartesian mind -- a part that is the source of my 
consciousness, and can survive the death of my physical body. 
KEVIN: Yes, that's right. Descartes mentions several times that one of 
his main aims in proving he has a Cartesian mind is to show that "the 
decay of the body does not imply the destruction of the mind", which is 
"enough to give mortals the hope of an after-life" (Synopsis, CSM II, p. 10).28 
Righf then, let's get down to business. I think it will be a good idea if I 
start you off at the beginning of the Meditations, and take you through the 
issues that lead up to the proof. The proof itself is fairly brief, but it draws 
23 CSM II, p. 11. 
24 CSM II, pp. 56, 57, 61. 
25 CSM II, pp. 57 and 59. 
26 CSM II, p. 59. 
27 CSM II, p. 59. 
28 See also CSM II, p. 3, where the same sentiments are expressed. 
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quite heavily on the preceding discussion. So you need to find out exactly 
where Descartes is coming from, and what the technical terms he uses in his 
proof mean, and so on. How does that sound? 
BEV AN: Sounds fine. . .. Just before we get going though, there's 
something I'd like to ask you. 
KEVIN: What's that? 
BEV AN: Will you get me another beer? 
